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INTRODUCTION
Smallholder irrigation is an important rural development 
factor, creating employment opportunities, generating income 
and enhancing food security in Africa in general, and in South 
Africa (SA) in particular (Bacha et al., 2011; Van Averbeke et 
al., 2011; Denison and Manona, 2007; Speelman, 2009). As a 
result, South Africa has invested in the sector by rehabilitating 
existing irrigation schemes (Perret and Geyser, 2007). In 2012 
the government budgeted R15 million for rehabilitation of 
smallholder irrigation schemes (DAFF, 2012). On the other 
hand, the agriculture sector, being the largest water user, is under 
pressure to release water to other sectors (Kanyoka et al., 2008). 
The growing water scarcity continues to put pressure on farmers 
to use water more efficiently. A growing area of interest in SA 
is that of finding balanced and effective resource management 
strategies for allocating water among the key sectors (Speelman, 
2009; Yokwe, 2006).
Effective water resource management requires that water be 
treated as an economic good. As such, making rational decisions 
about water resource management requires reliable estimates 
of the economic value of water (Speelman, 2009; Hellegers and 
Perry, 2006). Knowledge of this value contributes significantly in 
designing fair, informed and rational pricing systems, providing 
incentives to irrigators to use water sparingly and efficiently, 
and allowing recovery operations and maintenance (Perret and 
Geyser, 2007). Moreover, understanding water values plays an 
important role when making investment decisions in water 
resources development, and policy decisions on sustainable 
water use and water allocations.
In South Africa, the issue of water valuation among small-
scale irrigation schemes is topical, following the new water 
policy released by the Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry in 
April 1997. According to the new policy, water subsidies paid to 
farmers will gradually decrease as they will increasingly have to 
pay for their water use (DWAF, 2004). It is in this context that 
studies investigating willingness to pay (WTP) are more widely 
available (Adepoju and Omonona, 2009; Akter, 2006; Alhassan, 
2012; Bogale and Urgessa, 2012; Futija et al., 2005; Kanyoka 
et al., 2008; Moffat et al., 2011; Ndetewio et al., 2013). Ability 
to pay (ATP) studies are not common and yet are important, 
since, whilst irrigators may be willing to pay for improved water 
services, the question of their ability to do so still remains. While 
WTP is a maximum amount which water-users are willing to 
pay for a given service, it is difficult to directly use this as basis 
of setting tariffs as there are variations in characteristics that 
determine this willingness (Ndetewio et al., 2013). Moreover, it 
is necessary to set the irrigation water fee at a price level that the 
majority of irrigators can actually afford to pay, especially where 
most of these farmers depend on irrigation for their livelihoods. 
For that purpose, ATP is frequently referred to and used as it 
reflects an affordable price. 
The ATP is considered as the amount which irrigators 
can pay for water for their cropping needs and is calculated 
with reference to gross margins (Fujita et al., 2005). Charging 
farmers for irrigation water should be done carefully because 
if prices are set too low, revenues may not be sufficient to cover 
the full costs of supplying water. On the other hand, if water 
prices are set too high, irrigators may not be able to afford the 
new improved irrigation water supply. Therefore, to set the 
required water price, information on the ability of irrigators 
to pay for such services is essential. Since pricing of water is 
a key component of an appropriate incentive for efficiency, 
sustainability and accountability, there is a need to research the 
demand for the service in order to understand the fundamental 
value that irrigators place on the improved water service, so 
that the price that reflects the ability of the irrigators to pay for 
the improved water services can be established (Alebel, 2002). 
This study, therefore, aimed to estimate the amount farmers are 
able to pay for irrigation services using farmers’ gross margins. 
Furthermore, the study investigates the factors that determine 
farmers’ ATP for irrigation in Msinga Local Municipality. The 
study was part of a project initiated, managed and funded by 
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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study was to determine smallholder farmers’ ability to pay (ATP) for improved irrigation water supply, 
using their gross margins, in rural KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The analysis was conducted on a sample of 161 irrigators. 
Production data were collected from the irrigators and the residual imputation method (RIM) was used to calculate the 
gross margins that the farmers realised. An ordinary least squares regression was used to investigate factors affecting ATP. 
Results indicate that factors such as labour, training, household assets and road conditions positively influence ATP. The 
study highlights the importance of support to farmers and their institutions. The study also concludes that farmers are 
making profits from their irrigated crops, especially tomatoes, and therefore recommends that farmers start paying for the 
water used for their crops.
Keywords: smallholder irrigation, ability to pay, residual imputation method, gross margins, OLS regression  
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the Water Research Commission (WRC) (K5/2176) entitled 
‘Empowerment of women in rural areas through water use 
security and agricultural skills training for gender equity 
and poverty reduction in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) and North 
West Province’.
STUDY AREA
Primary data for the study were collected in Msinga Local 
Municipality, Mzinyathi District, South Africa. Over 70% of 
this land (1 725 km2) is under traditional authority while the 
remaining 30% is commercial farm land (Dearlove, 2007). Much 
of the terrain is located in deep gorges of the Tugela and Buffalo 
rivers. This effectively isolates the municipal area from the 
immediate surrounding municipal areas.
Msinga has very limited employment opportunities. 
Agriculture is one of the most important economic sectors in 
Msinga, with most households engaged in smallholder farming 
(Cousins, 2012; Sinyolo, 2013). Rain-fed crop production, 
however, is very challenging in Msinga because the area is both 
hot and dry. The area is characterized by frequent droughts, 
making irrigation the main mode of household food production 
(Cousins, 2012). One opportunity that exists for some of 
the rural people to increase incomes and participate in the 
local economy is provided by irrigation farming, specifically 
in the Tugela Ferry and Mooi River Irrigation Schemes. The 
two irrigation schemes play an important role in the local 
economy of Msinga as sources of food, employment and 
market for agricultural inputs (Cousins, 2012; Gomo, 2012; 
Sinyolo, 2013) Figure 4.1 shows the location of Msinga Local 
Municipality in SA.
Figure 1 
Location of the Tugela Ferry and Mooi River Irrigation Schemes in Msinga Local Municipality, South Africa
The distinctive features of irrigation farming in the Msinga 
schemes are very similar to those found in other low-cost, 
gravity-fed schemes in South Africa. They are similar in plot 
sizes, which are small. In irrigation schemes like Msinga plot 
sizes are 0.1 ha, although farmers can accumulate a number of 
plots and end up with an average of 0.24 ha each (Sinyolo et al., 
2014). The systems of production are highly labour-intensive 
and common cash crops grown include green maize, tomatoes, 
cabbage, potatoes, and leafy green vegetables. The production of 
specialized types of fresh produce like garlic, beetroot, etc., for 
niche markets is absent or very limited (Denison and Manona, 
2007; Van Averbeke and Khosa, 2011; Cousins, 2012).
The Tugela Ferry Irrigation Scheme (TFIS) is located on 
both banks of the Tugela river, which supplies the scheme with 
water. The scheme was planned and constructed by the Natal 
Native Trust between 1898 and 1902 and has been operational 
ever since (Cousins, 2012). The scheme is made up of 7 blocks 
of irrigable land covering 837 ha (Cousins, 2012; Fanadzo, 
2012). A total of about 1 500 irrigators participate in the scheme, 
growing various crops. According to Cousins (2012), the Tugela 
Ferry irrigators comprise about 15% of all smallholder irrigation 
farmers in the KZN Province (Sinyolo, 2013).
Farmers in the irrigation scheme were initially allocated 2 
plots each of 0.1 ha in size. Over time, some farmers acquired 
more plots through leasing or borrowing. The main access to 
land is through the traditional authorities who allocate land to 
households. Selling of land is not permissible under the current 
traditional land tenure system.
Initially, all of the blocks were to receive water from the 
main gravity-fed canal; however, over time water shortages 
have persisted, leaving only 4 blocks to benefit from the canal 
while other blocks use motorized pumps. The 4 blocks receiving 
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water under the gravity system use a canal that is 31 km long 
to draw the water. Another block uses a diesel pump whilst the 
remaining 2 blocks use electric pumps. 
In the Mooi River Irrigation Scheme (MRIS), a diversion 
constructed across the Mooi River abstracts water into a canal, 
which runs for a distance of 20.8 km from the abstraction point 
to the end of the scheme (DAEA, 2011). The scheme has 15 
blocks of different sizes. The exact year that the scheme was 
established is not known; however, it is speculated that it may 
have been early in the 20th century. Most of the farmers currently 
in MRIS and TFIS, and even some non-members, grew up 
with their parents participating in the scheme. Essentially, the 
purpose of the scheme is to improve the livelihoods of those 
in the surrounding areas through food production and job 
creation (Gomo, 2012). The scheme covers a total area of 600 
ha, divided into plots which are 0.1 ha. The scheme is made up 
of approximately 824 farmers, each occupying at least 1 plot; 
however, some farmers occupy more than one (DAEA, 2011). 
Irrigators do not have other land outside the irrigation scheme, 
although dryland farming is prevalent in other parts of the area.
The scheme is managed through block committees, which, 
amongst other things, see to the distribution of water. As a 
whole, the scheme is managed by the Irrigation Management 
Committee which ensures equitable water distribution and 
resolves conflicts (Gomo, 2012). The first 11 blocks draw water 
under gravity and the last 4 blocks receive water that is diesel 
pumped. Initially, all the blocks received water from the main 
canal, but water shortages due to leakages and multiple uses, and 
increased numbers of participants, has meant that only the first 
11 blocks benefit from the gravity-fed canal (Gomo, 2012).
METHODS
Data collection
A structured questionnaire was used to interview the farmers 
who were household heads. The data collected include 
household characteristics, land, crop systems, market, sources 
of off-farm income, credit, water management aspects, and 
problems associated with agricultural practices in general. 
The questionnaire was pre-tested and modified accordingly to 
improve its reliability and validity. Field data were collected 
in November 2013 over a period of 3 weeks from 2 irrigation 
schemes, i.e., MRIS and TFIS. 
Households in the two study sites were stratified into gravity-
fed and pump-fed irrigators (Table 1). Gravity-fed irrigators in 
Tugela Ferry were not included in the study as the scheme was 
under rehabilitation at the time of the survey. The farmers had 
not been producing crops for a year, which made it difficult for 
irrigators in that part of the scheme to meaningfully participate 
in the survey. The proportional random sampling method was 
used to select the women used for the study, in order to equally 
represent the categories of gravity-fed and pump-fed farmers. 
A random sampling procedure was employed to select a total of 
161 respondents, where 131 were from the MRIS and 30 were 
from TFIS. Most blocks in TFIS where not functional during 
the time of the survey.  Hence, a sample of 30 farmers was a fair 
representation of the operational units in the scheme.
TABLE 1
Distribution of sampled farmers in each study area
Irrigation method











The residual imputation method (RIM) was used to measure 
the return to water out of the gross margin obtained from 
all the production inputs employed. The residual imputation 
method is the most frequently used approach to applied shadow 
pricing of producers’ goods, particularly for irrigation water 
(Young, 1996; Speelman, 2009; Yokwe, 2006). For the RIM, the 
incremental contribution of each input in the production process 
is determined. If appropriate prices can be assigned by market 
forces to all inputs but one, the remainder of total value of 
product is attributed to the remaining or residual input, which in 
this case is water (Young, 1996; Lange and Hassan, 2007).
The residual valuation assumes that if all markets are 
competitive, except the one for water, the Total Value Product 
(TVP) equals exactly the opportunity costs (OC) of all the inputs:
TVP = ∑ VMPi*Qi +VMPw*Qw 
where: TVP = total value of the commodity produced; VMPi = 
value of marginal product of input i, VMPw = value of marginal 
product of water, Qi = quantity of input i used in production and 
Qw = quantity of water used in production. 
It is assumed that the opportunity costs of non-water inputs 
are given by their market prices. Therefore, the shadow price 
of water can be calculated as TVP less the costs of all non-water 
inputs to production and returns to land. The residual, obtained 
by subtracting the non-water input (including land) costs from 
total annual crop revenue, equals the gross margin (GM). The 
GM can be interpreted as the maximum amount the farmer 
could pay for water and variable costs. 
However, the gross margin would also include the 
replacement costs or depreciation, for the scheme to be 
sustainable. In other words, the realistic ability to pay is less than 
the gross margin by the adjustment for depreciation. 
The technique is based on two principles, as discussed in 
Young (1996) and Speelman (2009):  
• The prices of all resources should equal returns at the 
margin. This is a well-known condition for competitive 
equilibrium, i.e., as would occur if perfectly competitive 
markets were to exist for all agricultural inputs.
• The total value of production (TVP) can be divided into 
shares; in such a way that each resource is paid according to 
the value of its marginal productivity (VMP) and the total 
product is completely exhausted (Young, 1996; Lange and 
Hassan, 2007). 
The RIM has the advantage of being relatively easy to 
implement. However, it is sensitive to small variations in the 
specification of the production function and assumptions 
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about market and policy environment. Therefore, the RIM 
is only suitable when the residual input contributes a large 
fraction of the output value, as is the case for water in irrigated 
agriculture in water-scarce regions (Speelman, 2009; Yokwe, 
2006). If an input to production is omitted or underestimated, 
its contribution is wrongly attributed to water. To overcome this 
problem, all relevant inputs should be included in the model. 
Some important inputs like farm labour, including family labour, 
are often unpaid. A shadow price is then estimated, usually in 
terms of the opportunity cost of the workers (Young, 1996).
In this study, the revenue earned by the farmers for each crop 
was calculated by multiplying their production by respective 
market prices. The portion of total production that was consumed 
by the household was excluded as it was taken as negligible. Inputs 
considered relevant in the production process, such as fertilizers, 
pesticides, energy, tillage, seed, land and labour, were taken into 
account. For fertilizers and pesticides the competitive market 
prices were used to determine costs. However, the value of inputs 
provided to farmers by extension services through the government 
subsidy scheme, e.g., fertilizers, pesticides and seeds, added to 
input costs. For inputs and the output, market and individual 
prices are considered to equal shadow prices.
GM = TVP − ∑PiQi 
Where: GM = gross margin and Pi = price of input i.
TVP = [PcQc+ PmQm+ PtQt+ PsQs+ PpQp+ PbQb+ PbuQbu] 
∑PiQi = PfQf+ PpeQpe+ PtiQti+ PfuQfu+ PlQl+ PseQse
Qc = Quantity of cabbage heads harvested per hectare
Qm = Quantity of maize harvested per hectare
Qt  = Quantity of tomatoes harvested per hectare
Qs = Quantity of spinach bunches harvested per hectare
Qp = Quantity of potato bags harvested per hectare
Qb = Quantity of bean bags harvested
Qbu = Quantity of butternut bags harvested per hectare
Qf  = Quantity of fertilizer used per hectare
Qpe = Quantity of pesticide used per hectare
Qti = Number of times tillage done per hectare
Qfu = Number of litres used per hectare
Ql  = Number of times labour employed per hectare
Qse = Number of seed packets used per hectare
Pc  = Price per cabbage head (R5)
Pm = Price per ton of maize (R3 000)
Pt  = Price per tomato crate (R100)
Ps = Price per bunch of spinach (R10)
Pp = Price per bag of potatoes (R40)
Pb = Price per 5kg bag of beans (R40)
Pbu = Price per bag of butternuts (R30)
Pf = Price per bag of 50kg fertilizer (R600)
Ppe = Price per bag of 50kg pesticide (R540)
Pti = Price for tillage per ha (R500)
Pfu = Price of fuel per litre (R12.48)
Pl = Price of labour per day (R20)
Pse = Price per packet of seeds (R11)
Most farmers in Msinga employ family labour. According to 
Van Averbeke (2008), one of the important advantages of using 
family labour is flexibility. Individual family members are often 
faced with the choice between working on the farm and engaging 
in other economic activities, which may be more rewarding 
financially, hence motivating family members to work on the 
farm is a critical management factor. To calculate labour costs, 
a shadow price of R20/day per person was used. This value for 
labour costs was estimated based on discussions with farmers 
and extension officers during focus group discussions and key 
informant interviews, respectively. According to the focus group 
discussions and key informant interviews, labour is employed 
in the plots twice a week, for 4 weeks a month over a cropping 
season. To calculate the gross margins, the total costs were 
subtracted from the total revenue and then divided by the land 
occupied by the farmer in order to get gross margins per hectare.
OLS regression
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method was employed to 
determine the factors that influence farmers’ ATP. The OLS 
regression model was estimated as follows:
Y= β0+β1X1+β2X2+………+ βiXi +ei 
where: Y is the dependent variable, which is gross margin; β’s are 
the parameter estimates, X’s are the explanatory variables (Table 2). 
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics
The schemes also have some distinctive features: the majority of 
plot holders are women (88.75%). The average age of the farmers 
in the schemes was 58 years. This shows that the more elderly 
are more involved in agriculture. This could be indicative of 
the fact that the males and the younger population have moved 
to the cities to explore better opportunities. Household size 
ranges from 1 to 20, with an average of 7. This could potentially 
indicate a sizeable amount of family labour, especially when 
labour availability is mainly dependent on the family size. Of 
the sampled population, 57% had no education and 16% had 
obtained secondary education. This shows very low levels of 
literacy in Msinga. When looking at the duration of time that 
the farmers have been in the scheme (also a proxy for irrigation-
farming experience), the minimum is 1 year and the maximum 
is 40 years, with a mean duration of 19 years. Experience is 
expected to aid farmers in increasing both their productivity 
and profitability.
The production of food crops for home consumption is 
limited as, according to the farmers, less than 5% is consumed 
at home whilst the bulk of production is for sale. Farmers are 
commercially oriented and approach farming as a business. 
Almost all crops use fertilizers and crop chemicals. The use of 
hired labour is not common as most farmers employ household 
labour. An active, informal plot rental market makes it possible 
for many farmers to gain access to additional plots. More than 
30% of farmers indicated that they were leasing some land. This 
level of land rental could minimise the plots that are not under 
cultivation in any given year. 
The crops grown by most farmers in summer are maize, 
which is grown by 67% of the respondents, potatoes, grown 
by 63%, and tomatoes, grown by 38% of the sample. In winter, 
beans and cabbage were the dominant crops, with beans grown 
by 38% of the sample and cabbage grown by 27%. 
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TABLE 2
Description of the variables
Variable Variable description Expected sign
Dependent variables
Ability to pay (ATP) Total gross margins realized by farmers per hectare
Independent variables
Gender Household head gender: male= 0, female=1 -
Age Household head age (years) +
Land security Farmer perceptions of their land tenure security +
Household labour Number of household members available to work in the plots +
Household labour1 Number of household members available to work in the plots -
Duration Number of years that the household has been involved in the irrigation scheme +
Access to credit Access to credit in the past year: yes = 1, no = 0 +
Access to extension Access to extension services in the last year in numbers (Number of visits in the last 12 months) +
Training Agricultural skills training: yes = 1, no = 0 +
Total land Total land holdings of household (ha) -
Household assets The value of household assets (Rands) +
Livestock size Livestock size in Tropical Livestock Units (TLU) +
Off-farm income Off-farm income (Rands) +
Pump_1 Pump used: electric pump = 1, gravity or otherwise = 0 +
Pump_2 Pump used: diesel pump = 1, gravity or otherwise = 0 +
Education_1 Education level of respondent: no education = 1, primary education or otherwise = 0 -
Education_2 Education level of respondent: secondary education = 1, primary education or otherwise = 0 +
Scheme management Farmers’ perceptions on the management of the scheme: good = 1, poor = 0 +
Road conditions Farmers’ perceptions on the road conditions: good = 1, poor = 0 +
1Household labour has been included in the model to account for its marginal effect on ATP. Initially, labour is expected to have a positive effect on 
ATP, but as it increases, it is expected to have a negative effect on production and consequently negative affect on ATP.
Table 3 shows the crops grown by season in the schemes and 
the yields realized. An average of 3.56 t/ha of maize is produced 
by the farmers in the schemes, with the mean gross margin being 
3 497.57 R/ha. According to Mnkeni et al. (2010), maize could 
potentially yield 8.2 t/ha. The average yield for potatoes is 21.4 
t/ha with a mean gross margin of 3 501.79 R/ha. Mnkeni et al. 
(2010) reports potato yields of 45.3 t/ha. Tomatoes had the least 
number of growers in summer. This may be due to the costly 
nature of tomato production, from fertilizers to herbicides and 
pesticides. On average, the yield of tomatoes was 28.94 t/ha, with 
an average gross margin of 17 249.41 R/ha. Mnkeni et al. (2010) 
reported an average potential yield of 47.1 t/ha for tomatoes. The 
results show that tomatoes had the highest gross margin among 
the summer season crops. However, gross margins are not the 
only determinant of farmers’ decisions to plant tomatoes, as it is 
a perishable commodity.  For example, access to reliable markets 
is critical.
With the winter crops, the average production of beans was 
0.87 t/ha with an average gross margin of R2 913.14. The number 
of cabbage producers was lower than for other crops. According 
to Mnkeni et al. (2010), the potential yield for cabbage is 64.8 
t/ha for small-scale irrigators. However, in these schemes, the 
average yield was 19.50 t/ha and the gross margin was 1 909.19 
R/ha per season, reflecting the low price for this crop. 
The yields reported in this study are below those reported 
by Mnkeni et al. (2010). However, this was expected. Lower 
yields are expected under farmer-managed conditions because 
of the less than optimal conditions under which they produce 
crops. This is especially true of Msinga, which experiences 
unfavourable conditions for agriculture. 
Table 4 shows comparisons of gross margins across 
categorical variables, and the t-tests presented in the table 
indicate that there is a statistically significant difference between 
the gross margins by gender. Males achieve higher gross margins 
than females, probably because the former have better access to 
resources, resulting in higher productivity. 
The difference between the gross margins of those who felt 
land secure and their counterparts was statistically significant. 
On average, the land secure realised higher gross margins 
compared to the insecure. This is expected as those with secure 
land tenure invest resources and measures that lead to improved 
long-term productivity relative to their counterparts. There were 
statistically significant differences between gross margins based 
on the type of irrigation water conveyance method. Farmers 
relying on gravity had higher gross margins compared to those 
using motorized pumps. Gravity irrigation water is cheaper and 
hence leads to high gross margins. 
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TABLE 3
Crop yields and gross margins for crops dominant in summer and those dominant in winter. Source: Household survey (2013)











Maize 108 67.08 3.56 −R5 500 R14 700 3 498
Potatoes 101 62.73 21. 35 −R2 900 R10 700 3 502
Tomatoes 61 37.89 28.94 −R5 420 R39 500 17 249
Winter crops
Beans 66 41.00 0.87 −R2 593 R9 970 2 913
Cabbage 44 27.33 19.50 −R1 600 R6 489 1 909
TABLE 4
Gross margin comparisons across different categorical variables (source: household survey, 2013)
Variable definition
Category 0 Category 1
t-test
significance
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Gender (0 = female, 1 = male) R11 898.01 13 743.35 R18 880.73 18 058.25 **
Irrigation system (0 = gravity, 1 = 
motorized pump) R13 464.69 16 149.44 R11 951.22 12 455.86 ns
Land security (0 = insecure, 1 = 
secure) R10 485.90 13 031.27 R16 693.16 15 986.95 ***
Road conditions (0 = poor, 1 = 
good) R10 561.06 14 073.41 R13 237.37 14 520.18 ns
Notes: *** and ** mean significant at 1%, 5% levels of significance, respectively 
Factors affecting ability to pay for water
An OLS model was estimated to determine the household 
characteristics that predict households’ ATP for improved 
irrigation. The model results are presented in Table 5. The results 
show that, collectively, all estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant since the F statistic is statistically significant (p 
< 0.01). The Adjusted R2 value of about 31% is acceptable 
considering this is cross-sectional data. The Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC) was employed to check whether the model was 
correctly specified.  The results showed that the OLS was a 
correct specification of the model.
Among the explanatory variables included in the analysis, 
7 variables had a significant effect on respondents’ ATP. 
Results from the estimated model reveal that gender, land 
security, household labour, household labour squared, training, 
household assets and road conditions significantly impact on 
farmers’ ATP. The gender of the household head significantly 
affects the ATP (p < 0.1). The results indicate that if the 
household head is female, the ATP is R6 400.56 less than that of 
male-headed households, ceteris paribus. 
The parameter estimate for land security is negative and 
significant (p < 0.05). This implies that the ATP for farmers who 
do not feel secure with their land is R4 776.26 less than that of 
those who feel secure, ceteris paribus. 
The household labour coefficient estimate is positive and 
significant (p < 0.01). This implies that if the household labour 
increases by 1 person, the ATP will increase by R3 187.98, ceteris 
paribus. However, the relationship between labour and gross 
margin is not linear. The coefficient estimate for household 
labour squared is negative and significant (p < 0.05). As 
household labour increases, the household’s ATP for improved 
irrigation initially increases but decreases at higher levels of 
household labour, ceteris paribus. 
The coefficient estimate for training is positive and significant 
(p < 0.05). This implies that those farmers/household heads who 
have received some agriculture-related training have R6 590.72 
more ATP for irrigation water compared to those who have not 
received any form of training, ceteris paribus. This was expected 
as training can equip farmers with the information that can help 
them to increase productivity, which increases their ATP.
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TABLE 5
Determinants of farmers’ ability to pay for improved 
irrigation (source: household survey, 2013)
Variable Coefficient Std. Err.
Gender −6 400.56* 3 324.14
Age −113.17 81.64
Land security −4 776.26** 2 341.61
Household labour 3 187.98*** 1 071.52
Household labour squared −208.37** 108.44
Duration 7.00 49.48
Credit access −545.73 2 507.21
Extension service access −254.9 570.06
Training 6 590.72** 2 129.12
Total land holdings 2 088.71 1 763.82
Household assets 0.03** 0.01
Livestock size −36.29 83.88
Off-farm income 0.12 0.17
Pump_1 9 078.06 5 519.16
Pump_2 1 111.27 2 488.54
Education_1 4 368.7 2 358.14
Education_2 −285.14 3 336.54
Scheme management −3 415.6 2 244.71
Road conditions 1 598.91** 752.47
Cons 16 964.1
9 410.87F statistic    ***
Adjusted R-squared     0.3088
n 160
Note on statistical significance:  *= p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05, *** = p < 0.01
Accordingly, the parameter estimate for household assets is 
positive and significant (p < 0.1). This implies that an increase in 
the household assets will result in an increase in the household’s 
ATP for the improved irrigation, ceteris paribus. Household 
assets are a sign of wealth such that families with high-value 
assets are expected to have invested in more capital and even 
production technologies, which would allow them to produce 
more, realize higher gross margins and, consequently, be able 
to pay more for improved irrigation. Household assets in the 
present study include houses, cars, water tanks, motor cycles, 
etc., which were all valued and added together to get their total 
value at household level.
According to the model, farmers’ perceptions of the road 
conditions impact on their ATP for improved irrigation. The 
parameter estimate for road conditions is positive and significant 
(p < 0.05). That is, if farmers perceive the road conditions to be 
good, their ATP for irrigation water will be R1 598.91 more than 
that of their counterparts. Good road conditions imply easier 
access to markets. If farmers have better access to markets, they 
are able to sell their produce with ease and realize higher gross 
margins, which in turn leads to increased ATP for water. 
DISCUSSION
The findings that male-headed households earn higher gross 
margins in this study suggests that such households generally 
have better access to resources which is expected to lead to 
increased profits and therefore higher ATP.  These findings are 
in line with those of Quisumbing (1996) and Udry et al. (1995), 
who found that in Sub-Saharan Africa, women are less educated 
and have limited access to labour, fertilizers and other inputs. 
That is, women have to ‘learn by doing’ as most of them are 
illiterate and often learn agricultural practices that are passed 
from one generation to another.   This differs from males who 
have higher literacy rates and access to resources, and therefore 
can achieve higher productivity and gross margins. Kyomugisha 
(2009) also found similar results where security of land tenure 
is one of the factors that influence investment to enhance land 
productivity and gross margins. Farmers who have secure land 
tenure are more likely to invest in improved production practices 
than their counterparts. Farmers who do have not security of 
land tenure may not invest much to keep the land productive, 
e.g., adopting practices like crop rotation, as they may be trying 
to maximize extraction, in the process reducing the quality of 
the soil and its productivity. Kyomugisha (2009) concludes that 
secure land tenure impacts positively on the level of investment 
made towards production, which increases productivity and 
gross margins, and the farmers ATP for water.
The initial increase in ATP, which is followed by a decrease 
as labour increases, can be explained from a productivity 
perspective.  Given the small farm sizes under irrigation, initial 
increases in labour lead to higher productivity.  However, 
eventually further increases result in reduced productivity and, 
by extrapolation, a decline in ATP.
There are a number of organizations training farmers; 
these are from the government, non-government organizations 
and the private sector. The government is the major player in 
providing training through its various agricultural development 
programmes (Kinambuga, 2010). The government also 
collaborates with non-governmental organizations to train 
farmers. Nevertheless, the proportion of farmers who access 
training is very low and this has a bearing on their production 
abilities, and thus gross margins achieved and their ATP for 
irrigation water. Only 31% of the respondents had received 
training related to agriculture. Training is important as it gives 
farmers production information and technologies that can 
increase their productivity. Therefore, farmers with no training 
risk having low production due to lack of knowledge. The 
average asset base of the farmers in the study was R83 916.34. 
The expectation is that households with a higher value of assets 
also do better in their level of production and make good gross 
margins, thus should afford higher ATP for irrigation water. This 
is in agreement with Kinambuga (2010). 
According to Arias et al. (2013), when market integration 
of producers is limited, interventions to reduce barriers to 
market participation will often have a greater payoff. One such 
intervention is improving market information systems, by 
improving feeder roads or reducing the fees that traders pay 
to transport products between markets. Therefore, farmers’ 
perception of their roads is one way to determine their access 
to market (Arias et al., 2013). In the present study, farmers’ 
perceptions have been used as a proxy for market access, and 
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CONCLUSIONS
The main aim of this study was to determine the ability of 
farmers to pay for improved irrigation water supply in rural 
KZN’s Msinga Local Municipality, and to determine factors 
that determine their ATP for improved irrigation. Results show 
that farmers are realizing positive gross margins from their 
plots, although some made negative gross margins due to harsh 
weather conditions, but in general positive gross margins are 
realized from the irrigation schemes. The study shows that 
support services such as training are pivotal in improving 
farmers’ understanding of agricultural issues, influencing their 
cropping patterns, and thus their ATP for water. Furthermore, 
the study shows the importance of institutions, particularly 
security of land tenure, that also influence the ability of farmers 
to pay for irrigation water. The study recommends increased 
farmer training to expose farmers to agricultural knowledge. 
The study further concludes that, given the gross margins of 
the farmers, overall the farmers have the ATP for improved 
irrigation.  Government policies to ensure sustainability of 
smallholder irrigation schemes should recognize the opportunity 
to recoup running costs directly from farmers.
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